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Abstract 
In this paper we use a large overlapping generations model with individuals that differ 
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indicate that although in both economies the aggregate effects of removing social security are 
qualitatively similar, the standard model economy underestimates both the welfare losses of the 
individuals living at the period of the pension reform and the increase in pre-tax income inequality 
associated with such policy change.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Social Security, overlapping generations. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: E62; H55; J11 
 
 
 
† Departament of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; E.mail: rojas@eco.uc3m.es 
 
 
 
 
 
* I am grateful to Lans Bovemberg for a helpful discussion while visiting the OCFEB (Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam) and Antonia Diaz for useful comments. Financial support from a 
DGESIC grant PB98-1058 is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Introduction
Countries in Latin America have been ahead of other regions in undertaking major reform
from pay-as-you-go de¯ned-bene¯t pension plans to fully funded, de¯ned-contribution pension
plans. Because of the successful Chilean pension model, a notable number of Latin American
countries have undertaken deep pension reform. Aiyer (1997) among others have highlighted
the reform e®orts in a sample of countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
One factor that has contributed to the need for reform in these countries is the insu±ciency
of contributions derived fron the sharp decrease in fertility rates and the high level of tax
evasion. Despite these pension reforms in Latin America most of the developed countries
have not yet accomplished the reform of their pay-as-you-go social security systems even
when demographic projections for the next 30 years predict a substantial increase in the
number of retirees over the working population. This paper contributes to this debate by
arguing that the existence of imperfect substitutability in production between workers with
di®erent labor market experience changes in a quantitatively relevant way the dynamics
of the income distribution measured by the Gini index and the welfare of the generations
living at the time of the policy reform in a way that may limit the political support for the
implementation of such reform. In particular, this paper evaluates the e®ects of phasing out
the existing pay-as-you-go pension system in Spain although the e®ects identi¯ed here can
also be relevant for any other economy. The analysis is performed in a large overlapping
generations model with enough heterogeneity across individuals of the same generation so as
to replicate both the earnings distribution and the percentage of the population a®ected by
some key institutional features of the spanish social security system such as the existence of
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a maximum and minimum pensions limits. In this framework, I analyze the macroeconomic
and welfare e®ects of phasing out the existing pay-as-you-go social security system in two
model economies that di®er from each other in the degree of substitution of the labor input
with di®erent experience levels and ¯nd that the standard model economy understimates
both the welfare losses of the individuals living at the period of the pension reform and the
increase in pre-tax income inequality associated with such policy change.
This paper is not new in addressing the e®ects of privatizing social security. Some examples
close in spirit to this paper are Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987), Miles (1999) and Broer (1999).
These papers are motivated by the the potential economic e®ects caused by the individuals
that belong to the baby-boom generation as they enter retirement. In this sense, the recent
research e®ort on social security has mainly concentrated on the e±ciency of the current
pay-as-you-go pension system (e.g. Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) and Boldrin et al. (1999) ), the
design of a feasible reform to a funded system (e.g. Conesa et al. (2000), Arjona (2000a) and
Huang et al. (1996)) and the ¯scal adjustments that prevents from privatization (De Nardi
et al. (1999) and Arjona (2000b) and Montero (1999) for the Spanish economy). These
studies are characterized by the perfect substitutability of workers with di®erent levels of
work experience, namely they abstract from the possible e®ect that a decrease in the labor
supply of younger workers following a privatization of the pension system could have on the
relative labor earnings of older workers at the time of the policy reform. In sharp contrast
with this assumption, there are many empirical studies (e.g. Macunovich (1999), Murphy and
Welch (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Freeman (1979), Welch (1979) and Berger (1985))
that have found that the age-earnings pro¯le of workers appears to be signi¯cantly a®ected
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by the relative supply of workers with di®erent years of working experience. Despite the
potential implications of this interaction for a variety of macroeconomic issues, there are not
many studies that have attempted to introduce these e®ects in macroeconomic models. Some
exemptions are the seminal work of Lam (1989) that studied the e®ects of changes in age
structure on life-cycle wage pro¯les in stable populations. In addition, Kremer and Thomsom
(1998) have studied the implications of the imperfect substitution between young and old
workers for the speed of convergence of per capita output between countries and ¯nd that
the existence of imperfect substitutability creates a kind of adjustment cost in human capital
because total output depends positively on each generation generation's human capital but
negatively on the change in human capital between generations. And more recently, Rojas
(2000) has shown that the e®ect of the aging of the baby-boom generation on the expected
increase in the share of GDP spent on pensions is less severe in a model that accounts for
cohort size e®ects than in one that abstracts from them.
This paper contributes to this last literature by comparing the quantitative properties of
a policy reform aimed at funding the pension system in the standard model economy with
perfect substitution across workers with di®erent experience levels with a model economy
where this substitutability is imperfect. Notice that with the phasing out of pensions, the
social security tax rate falls in response to the eliminated public pensions and as individuals
save for retirement through capital markets, the rate of return on capital falls. Both mechan-
ims usually induce a reallocation of work e®ort over the life-cycle, substituting hours worked
when young by hours worked when labor earnings peak. In the standard model economy this
process has no e®ects on the relative wage rate of less and more experienced workers. How-
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ever, in the model economy which allows for imperfect substitution, this reallocation process
decreases the experience premium and imposes an additional cost (apart from the one caused
by the removal of pension bene¯ts) in terms of a lower life-time earnings on those agents that
are in the years before retirement at the period of the policy reform. In addition, the change
in the experienced premium moderates the fall in earnings inequality since the reallocation
of work e®ort towards later ages over the lifecycle is less pronounced, and consequently the
increase in pre-tax income inequality associated with the reform in public pensions is more
relevant. In particular, the income Gini rises from 0.355 in the initial steady state to 0.455
and 0.438 in the model with perfect and imperfect substitution respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economies I
investigate. Section 3 describes how the model is parameterized to be a realistic description
of the Spanish economy in 1995. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper. Section
5 studies the sensitivity of the results to di®erent modelling strategies and ¯nally Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by agents that live a maximum of I periods. Upon arrival at the
age of IA an agent starts taking decisions. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of time
that can be allocated to work or leisure up to age IR¡1. After this age agents retire. Each
agent faces an age dependent probability of surviving between age i and age i+1 at t denoted
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by si;t. Then the unconditional probability of reaching age i for an individual that has age v
at t is
¼iv;t =
iY
j=v+1
sj¡1;t+j¡v¡1 (1)
with ¼vv;t = 1. Let ¹i;t;j be the share of age-i and type-j individuals over the total population
at time t. Áj denotes the proportion of an agent of type j in a particular age group and ¹i;t
is the proportion of agents with age i over the total population. Consequently, ¹i;t;j = ¹i;tÁj .
The law of motion of the age structure of the population is
¹i+1;t+1 =
si;t¹i;t
1 + nt
(2)
where nt is the population growth rate. Finally, the next period share of newly born agents
¹1;t+1 is given by
¹1;t+1 = 1 ¡
IX
i=2
¹i;t+1: (3)
2.2 Preferences
At each point in time agents are assumed to maximize lifetime utility. Hence the problem
of the typical agent that at t has age i = v (v ¸ IA) is to choose consumption and leisure
li;t;j = 1 ¡ hi;t;j to solve the problem
Max
IX
i=v
¯i¡v¼iv;tU(ci;t+i¡v;j ;hi;t+i¡v;j) (4)
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subject to the following period-by-period constraint
ai+1;t+1;j = (1 + rt(1 ¡ ¿k))ai;t;j + yi;t;j ¡ ci;t;j (5)
with ai+1;t+1;j ¸ 0, a1;t;j = 0, aI+1;t;j = 0. The discount parameter is ¯, and is assumed to
be the same for all agents. Borrowing is not possible and agents accumulate asset holdings to
smooth consumption over time. rt is the interest rate net of depreciation, ai+1;t+1;j denotes
next period asset holdings, yi;t;j is labor income net of taxes plus transfers and ¿k is a
proportional capital income tax. Let ei;j be the e±ciency index, ¿ss;t the social security
proportional tax, ¿l a proportional labor income tax and di;t;j the social security bene¯ts
that are zero if i < IR and di;t otherwise. Finally wi;t denotes real wages, that are indexed
by age to account for the case of imperfect substitutability of labor of di®erent age groups,
and Bt is the accidental bequest received at t. These considerations allow us to de¯ne the
labor income net of taxes plus transfers as
yi;t;j = wi;tei;jhi;t;j(1 ¡ ¿l ¡ ¿ss;t)+ di;t;j +Bt: (6)
2.3 Production Technology
Production in period t is given by a standard constant returns to scale production function
that converts capital Kt and labor Nt into output. The technology At improves over time at
a constant rate because of labor augmenting technological change, At+1 = (1 +¸)At. Hence,
Yt = F(Kt;AtNt) = K
®
t (AtNt)
1¡® (7)
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with
Nt = g(Lt;Ht): (8)
where Lt and Ht denotes less and more experienced workers respectively and the function g
has continuous second derivatives and it is increasing and concave in labor inputs. Finally,
¯rms rent labor and capital at given wages and net interest rate to maximize
F(Kt;AtNt) ¡ (rt + ±)Kt ¡ wl;tLt ¡wh;tHt (9)
where ± is the depreciation rate for capital.
2.4 Government
The government levies a proportional social security tax on labor income ¿ss;t to ¯nance a
bene¯t di;t;j per retiree. This system is assumed to be self-¯nanced, i.e.
JX
j=1
IR¡1X
i=IA
¹i;t;jwi;thi;t;jei;j¿ss;t =
IR¡1X
i=IA
IX
i=IR
¹i;t;jdi;t;j (10)
where bene¯ts are computed applying a legal replacement rate to an average of past earnings
up to a maximum pension limit. Hence in age IR bene¯ts are given by,
dIR;t;j = max(Pmin;min(Pmax;
rep
1 + ¸
wav;j)) (11)
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where ,¸ rep, wav and Pmax are the productivity growth, the legal replacement rate, some
average of past earnings and the maximum pension bene¯t respectively. From IR + 1 to I
, the pension bene¯t is normalized by productivity growth (1 + ¸), since new pensions are
greater than old ones, i.e.
di;t;j =
di¡1;t;j
1 +¸
: (12)
The government also levies a proportional tax on capital ¿k and labor ¿l income to ¯nance
per capita government consumption Gt such that
JX
j=1
IX
i=IA
¹i;t;j(rtai;t;j¿k + wi;thi;t;jei;j¿l) = Gt: (13)
2.5 The Equilibrium
In this economy a Competitive Equilibrium is a list of sequences of quantities ci;t;j, hi;t;j , ai;t;j ,
¹i;t;j , di;t;j , Lt, Nt, Kt, prices wl;t, wh;t, rt, social security tax rates ¿ss;t and income tax rates
such that, at each point in time t:
1) ¯rms maximize pro¯ts setting wages and the interest rate equal to marginal products,
wl;t = FL(Kt; Lt;Ht) (14)
wh;t = FH(Kt; Lt; Ht) (15)
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rt = FK(Kt; Lt; Ht) ¡ ± (16)
2) agents maximize lifetime utility subject to the period budget constraints taking as given
wages, the interest rate, taxes, social security bene¯ts, survival probabilities, the age structure
of the population and accidental bequests,
3) the age structure of the population f¹i;tg is stationary and follows the aggregate law of
motion (1), (2) and (3),
4) accidental bequests are given by
Bt =
P
j
P
i ¹i¡1;t¡1;jai;t;j(1 ¡ si¡1;t¡1;j)
(1 + nt¡1)
P
j
PI
i=IA
¹i;t;j
(17)
where nt¡1 is the growth rate of the population between period t ¡ 1 and t.
5) market clearing conditions for capital and each type of labor,
Kt =
JX
j=1
IX
i=IA
¹i;t;jai;t;j (18)
Ht =
JX
j=1
IR¡1X
i=IE
¹i;t;jei;t;jhi;t;j (19)
Lt =
JX
j=1
IE¡1X
i=IA
¹i;tei;t;jhi;t;j (20)
where IE denotes the age at which an individual starts being considered as an experienced
worker.
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6) Finally, the budget constraint of the government is satis¯ed period by period.
Hence with these conditions the goods market clears every period,
F(Kt;Lt;Ht) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt = Kt+1+ Gt +
JX
j=1
X
i
¹i;t;jci;t;j : (21)
3 Calibration
3.1 Demographic Parameters
Agents reach adulthood at 20 and live up to age 95, after which death is certain. Each model
period corresponds to 5 years. The initial steady state is characterized by the stationary age
structure of the population associated with the age survival probabilities and the population
growth rate in 1995 of the spanish population being equal to 0:13% in anual term.
3.2 Preference Parameters
The period utility function is of the constant relative risk-aversion class
u(c; l) =
(cµl1¡µ)1¡¾
1 ¡ ¾ (22)
where the inverse of the elasticity of substitution ¾ and the share of consumption µ has been
set such that the average time spent working is around 1/3 and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is consistent with the empirical estimates reviewed in Auberbach and Kotliko®
(1987). Hence we use ¾ = 2 and µ = 0:33. Finally, the discount rate parameter is set equal
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to ¯ = 0:987 so as to reproduce a private capital-output ratio of 2:5 in the spanish economy
as reported by Puch and Licandro (1997).
3.3 Government
In this model, the ¯rst role played by the government is to run a pay-as-you-go social security
system that consists of a legal rule used to compute pension bene¯ts as a function of past
labor earnings. In particular, upon retirement an individual's pension is computed applying
a replacement rate of 100% over the average of earnings of the last 8 years before retirement.
The pension system in Spain also includes a maximum and a minimum pension level equal to
1.85 and 0.44 times the per-capita output in the spanish economy in 1995. Finally, the social
security tax rate ¿ss is set endogenously to cover the pension burden so that the pension's
system is self ¯nanced. Secondly, the government levies an income tax rate on capital and
labor income to ¯nance a given level of government consumption. In particular, we use a
value of ¿k = 0:186 and ¿l = 0:17 as reported by Bosca et al. (1999). These values generate
a government to output ratio of G=Y = 13:4 which is consistent with the average of this
number from 1970 to 1994 in Spain.
3.4 E±ciency unit pro¯le and Technology Parameters
3.4.1 E±ciency unit pro¯le
In order to generate enough heterogeneity across the individuals of the same generation, the
age speci¯c labor productivities are set following the procedure used by Huggett and Ventura
(1999) and is as follows. First, using the European Comunity Household Panel (ECHP, 1994)
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I compute an age speci¯c pro¯le of mean logarithmic gross hourly wages denoted by y^i for
workers aged bewteen 20 and 64. Then, it is assumed that upon birth an agent faces a
permanent individual shock z to its log e±ciency which determines its working productivity
over its career. This shock is normally distributed as
z » N (0; ¾2z) (23)
and the log e±ciency parameter at age 1 is y1=y^1+ z. Then an agent's log lifetime e±ciency
pro¯le evolves according to
yi¡ y^i = yi¡1¡ y^i¡1: (24)
Finally the e±ciency pro¯le is ei;j = exp(y^i+z). For computational purposes I follow Huggett
and Ventura (1998) and approximate the shock process z with 21 evenly-space values between
¡4¾z and 4¾z. The probabilities are calculated by integrating the area under the normal
distribution and the standard deviation of the stochastic process ¾z is set to 0.532 so that
the Gini index of the distribution of gross hourly wages of the model economy matches that
of the ECHP data, being equal to 0.31.
3.4.2 Technology Parameters
The capital share parameter is ® = 0:375 following the estimates of Domenech and Taguas
(1995) for the Spanish economy. The productivity growth has been set to ¸ = 1:5% in annual
terms which is the average growth of per-capita consumption over the period 1960-1995, and
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the depreciation parameter is set to match the average ratio of gross investment over output
I/Y=22.5%. This yields a value of ± = 9% in annual terms. These values are also used by
Conesa et al. (2000).
A decision concerning the aggregation of the labor input across di®erent age groups has to be
made. The empirical studies of the e®ects of changes in the relative number of workers by age
on age earnings pro¯le have usually used the constant elasticity of substitution form and the
translogarithmic form. For our purposes the CES functional form is very convenient because
it has only one elasticity of substitution across workers with di®erent levels of experience
(1=½) and it is °exible enough to account for the perfect substitutability case (½ = 0) and the
imperfect substitutability model economy when ½ > 0.
An additional decision has to be made concerning the way in which individuals with di®erent
experience levels are sorted into di®erent groups. Our approach follows the standard practice
in the labor literature that usually sorts the population into two experience groups. The ¯rst
includes those individuals with less than 25 years of experience, i.e. those who are between
20 and 44 years old. The second group contains those individuals with age more that 45
and that stay in the labor market until the retirement age 65. This choice is also consistent
with Murphy and Welch (1992) that although considering 4 groups of ten years of experience,
they ¯nd that those individuals with less than 20 years of experience are substitutes among
them, although they are complements with those of more than 20 years of working experience.
Given these considerations, the aggregate labor input is
Nt = B(°L
1¡½
t + (1 ¡°)H1¡½t )
1
1¡½ (25)
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where Lt and Ht are the labor supply in e±ciency units of workers with less and more than
25 years of working experience respectively, and B is a parameter that measures the e±ciency
of aggregate labor. The general procedure to set the values of the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution ½, the parameter B and the share parameter ° is as follows.
3.4.3 Perfect substitutability
In this model economy, a change in the relative supply of experienced workers does not
translate into changes in the relative wages on individuals by age. Consequently, this is the
case where ½ = 0. In addition, the value that governs the overall e±ciency of labor input
is set to a normalized value of B = 1. Finally, the value of the share parameter ° is set
such that the age-pro¯le of earnings in the model economy which consists of a product of
the market wage wi and the e±ciency index ei;j resembles the smoothed pro¯le of earnings
in the data. However, notice that since by construction the age-speci¯c pro¯le of e±ciency
units ei;j already captures this target, the share parameter ° has to be set such that
wh
wl
= 1.
Since the relative wage is given by
wh
wl
=
°
1 ¡°
³H
L
´¡½
(26)
then, when ½ = 0, wh
wl
= 1 if ° = 0:5.
3.4.4 Imperfect substitutability
Murphy and Welch (1992), among others, have studied the existence of imperfect substi-
tutability among workers with di®erent levels of experience and education. Their estimates
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of the elasticities of complementarity imply values of the ½ parameter between 0.5 and 2.
In this paper we use ½ = 1:2 as our benchmark case for the case of imperfect substitution
although in the sensitivity analysis I check the robustness of the results with a much lower
½ parameter. Finally, the share parameter ° is set (as before) such that whwl = 1, yielding
° = 0:6311, and the parameter that governs the overall e±ciency of the labor input B is set
so that the level of wages equals the level of spot wages in the benchmark model economy
with perfect substitutability between young and old workers, hence both model economies
share the same features in the initial steady state. This yields B = 0:9714.
3.5 Computation Method
The computational procedure used to solve for the transitional dynamics of the model follows
Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987). Notice that since the economy undergoes a transition in which
conditions change over time and economic agents are assumed to take into account future
prices in determining their behavior, it is necessary to solve simultaneously for equilibrium
in all transition years. In order to implement the computational procedure I assume that the
¯nal steady state is reached in 200 model periods, and I have checked that it was not binding.
The main steps for solving this system of 200 equations and 200 unknowns are the following.
A) Given initial conditions K1, ffai;t;jgIi=IAgt=1 and the path that follows the age struc-
ture of the population ff¹i;tgIi=1gt=200t=1 , provide a guess for the path of the capital stock
fKtgt=200t=2 , unintended bequests fBtgt=200t=1 and the age pro¯le ofwork e®ort ffhi;t;jgIr¡1i=IAgt=200t=1 .
² Using ffhi;t;jgIr¡1i=IAgt=200t=1 compute labor input fLtgt=90t=1 and fHtgt=200t=1 .
² Using fKtgt=200t=1 , fLtgt=200t=1 , fHtgt=200t=1 and the marginal productivity conditions, com-
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pute frtgt=200t=1 and wages by type fwl;tg and fwh;tg.
² Using ffhi;t;jgIr¡1i=IAgt=200t=1 , fwl;tg and fwh;tg, compute pension bene¯ts to which agents
qualify ffdi;t;jgIi=Irgt=200t=1 and the necessary social security tax f¿ss;tgt=200t=1 to keep bal-
anced the system.
² Use frtg, wages, transfers, and labor e®ort ffhi;t;jgIr¡1i=IAgt=200t=1 to solve the consumer
problem in asset holdings fai;t;jgt=200t=2 8i; j.
² Use fai;t;jgt=200t=2 8i; j to compute the implied capital stock fKtgt=200t=2 by aggregating the
asset holdings across ages for each t and to compute the new level of bequests using
(17) and use the implied age pro¯le of consumption to compute a new guess of the
age pro¯le of work e®ort ffhi;t;jgIr¡1i=IAgt=200t=1 by means of the intratemporal marginal
condition.
B) If the implied fKtgt=200t=2 , fBtgt=200t=1 and ffhi;t;jgIr¡1IA gt=200t=1 are equal to the guesses of step
A) the algorithm is stopped. If not, update the guess and go back to step A).
4 Findings
4.1 Aggregate Features
The initial steady state of the model economy has been calibrated to reproduce some key
aggregate ratios of the spanish economy in 1995 and the distribution of wages in the pop-
ulation. Hence, in these model economies there is inter-generational and intra-generational
heterogeneity. This particular feature is important because if I want the model economy to
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reproduce the share of GDP spent on pensions of the data 10%, the model economy has to be
able to endogenously generate a similar percentage of the retirees a®ected by the minimum
pension °oor as in the data being this number 23% for those individuals a±liated to the
Regimen General. In this respect, in the initial steady state of the model economy the per-
centage of GDP spent on pensions is 10:3% and the percentage of the population receiving the
minimum pension level is 27:43% being these two numbers close to their empirical counter-
parts. Finally, in the model economy the percentage of pensioneers a®ected by the maximum
pension level is 0:47% being this number slightly higher than the one in data 0:015%. On
the other hand, recall the Gini index of wages was part of our calibration target being 0.311.
In this respect, the initial model economy generates endogenously a Gini index of earnings
(after taken into account hours worked) of 0.361 while the empirical counterpart in 1994 is
0.308. In addition, in the model economy the Gini index of wealth and pre-tax income is
0.567 and 0.355 repectively, where the de¯nition of income includes earnings, capital income,
social security bene¯ts and transfers due to unintended bequests.
In this framework, the policy experiment is to set to zero the social security legal replacement
ratewhich is applied to the average earnings before retirement in order to compute the pension
level in the ¯rst period of retirement. Notice that the pension reform analyzed in this paper
does no set to zero the pension bene¯ts of all retirees. Instead, only those individuals who are
near retirement su®er the removal of pensions bene¯ts. In addition, since it is assumed that
the government engages in a balanced budget policy each period, the fact that the government
still pays for the pension bene¯ts of old retirees after the policy reform means that the social
security tax rate decreases through time in a smoothly way.
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4.2 Aggregate E®ects of Pension Reform
In general with the pension reform, agents work harder on average due to the lower distortions
associated with the removal of social security taxes. This is specially true in the period of
the policy reform for agents that are near retirement. For this reason, in the ¯rst period of
the transition the capital-output and the interest rate slightly falls and increases respectively
(see Figure 1). In addition, as agents now save for retirement through the capital markets,
the capital stock increases inducing a higher wage rate and a lower market return on capital.
As agents have perfect foresight, they take into account the general equilibrium e®ect of a
falling interest rate and react by intertemporally substituting future consumption and leisure
by present consumption and leisure early in life. This means that there is a reallocation in the
life time distribution of labor supply. With funded pensions, young agents work less hours
when young and more hours when old being this process common to both model economies.
In the model economy with perfect susbtitution between less and more experienced workers,
this reallocation process of labor e®ort has no e®ect on the experience premium which stays
una®ected. However, if less and more experienced workers are imperfect substitutes in pro-
duction, as individuals born over the transition work less when young and harder when old
then the aggregate relative supply of experienced workers increases over the initial periods
of the transition and in the long run. This process brings about a fall in the experience
premium (see Figure 1) and partially compensates the tendency to concentrate labor supply
in last periods of the working life (see Figure 2). It is also worth noting that this process also
induce individuals to accumulate relatively more asset holdings over the early period of life
and hence the capital stock increases and the rate of return of capital falls relatively more in
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the model economy with imperfect substitution (see Figure 1).
4.2.1 Income Distribution Dynamics
There are a number of authors (Diamond (1996), James (1997)) that have suggested that one
of the unpleasant features of privatizing social security is the increase in income inequality
associated with such policy reform. One of the reasons that support this view is the strong
redistributive component related to the existence of a maximum and a minimum pension
°oor. In the present framework, this is very likely to be the case since in the initial steady
state with social security 27:43% of the retirees are receiving the minimum pension °oor. In
order to study whether there are quantitative di®erences between the behaviour of the model
economy with and without perfect substitutability following the social security reform, in
Figure 3 it is reported the dynamics of the Gini index (which a widely used indicator of
inequality) of earnings, wealth and pre-tax income through the transition between steady
states.
Firstly, notice that following the reform in social security the Gini earnings falls in the short
and in the long run. The reason is that with the removal of the pay-as-you-go system,
individuals tend to reallocate labor e®ort towards the ages when earnings peak and achieve
a smoother age pro¯le of work e®ort (see Figure 2). This process induces a more egalitarian
earnings distribution and is commom to both model economies (the one with perfect and
imperfect substitution between more an less experienced workers). However, in the model
economy with imperfect substitution, this process is partially compensated by the fall in
the wage premium and consequently the Gini index of earnings experiences a less relevant
20
decrease.
In addition, the dynamics of the Gini wealth indicates that wealth inequality increases since
although without social security all individuals save more than with social security, high
earnings households have higher saving rates and consequently wealth inequality incresases
very sharply. The key di®erence between model economies is that in the model economy
with imperfect substitution, the fall in the experience premium brings about a smother asset
allocation since the peak of earnings is less pronounced. Overall the dynamics of wealth
distribution and the removal of the minimum pension °oor associated with the privatization
of social security increases income inequality in both model economies. In particular the
income Gini rises from 0.355 in the initial steady state to 0.455 and 0.438 in the model
with perfect and imperfect substitution respectively. The reason being, the less pronounced
decrease in earnings inequality in the model with imperfect substitution between more and
less experienced workers.
4.3 Winners and Losers from Pension Reform
In order to compute the welfare e®ects of phasing out the pension system, I follow the
standard practice which consists of calculating compensating variations at birth for agents
born with di®erent ability levels and across time periods. In this sense, each generation is
labelled by the year in which they become adults and start taking decisions, i.e, generation
2000 is composed by those individuals that are aged 20-24 in the year of the policy reform
(2000), generation 1995 is composed by those individuals that became adults in that year
and consequently are in the age bracket 25-29 in 2000, and so on. Hence, in the year of the
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policy reform are 15 generations of adults, 5 of them are young workers (those aged 20-44),
4 are old workers (those aged 45-64)and 6 are retirees (those aged 65-95). The compensating
variation lists the negative of the percentage that consumption must be increase or decrease
by each period over the lifetime of individuals so as they stay with the same utility as in
the initial steady state with the pay-as-you-go system untouched. Consequently, the measure
computed is positive if there is a welfare gain. The results are shown in Table 1 for all the
generations living at the time of the policy reform and over.
It is worthy to describe ¯rstly the results concerning the younger individuals born at the
period of the pension reform. In general, the individuals that were una®ected by the minimum
pension °oor, i.e those with ability levels 10 and above are those who bene¯t more from
the reform of social security over the transition because, since they were not receiving the
minimum pension level, the change in the rate of return at which they can save through
retirement is greater, and so is the welfare gain. For the generations born at the period of
the policy reform and over there is not much di®erence between the model economy with
imperfect substitution among experience levels and the standard model without it. One
exception is worth noting. For the median and higher ability levels (recall that the median
is ability 11 since there are 21 types) the welfare gains of privatizing pensions are slightly
higher in the model with imperfect substitution (see Table 1). This is so because they enjoy
higher lifetime wages associated with the higher capital stock, and they are also allowed to
save for retirement through the market rate of return which is higher than the return on
social security contributions, although this e®ect is compensated by the lower interest rate
associated with the general equilibrium e®ect. As pointed out before, since in the model
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economy with imperfect susbtitution the capital stock increases relatively more following the
reform of pensions, those individuals born in the transition enjoy higher lifetime wages and
hence higher welfare than in the standard economy with perfect substitution. Notice that the
magnitude of the welfare gain is lower for those agents (with ability levels between 1 and 9)
whose pensions were below the minimum statutory level in the PAYG pension system because
in the public pensions regime they enjoyed a high return on social security contributions.
The most stricking di®erence between the model with and without imperfect substitution
among experience levels concerns the welfare e®ect of reforming public pensions for those
generations that are alive when the policy change is implemented. The ¯ndings are the
following. Recall that the pension reform analyzed in this paper leaves untouched the pensions
of the existing retirees. Consequently in both model economies their welfare is virtually
una®ected. However, there are important di®erences across model economies in the well-
being of agents that are before retirement, i.e those in the age bracket 25-64.
On the one hand, in the model economy with imperfect substitution old workers (45-64)
su®er a decline in the rate of return on assets and a lower market wage since the experience
premium falls. Then the welfare losses of these individuals are more relevant as compared
to the standard model economy. On the other hand, as we consider younger workers, they
still su®er a decline in both the rate of return on savings and the future wages when old, but
they start enjoying the higher wages while being unexperienced workers (in the imperefct
substitutability case). Eventually, this last e®ect dominates the former and as we consider
those generations born in the period of the policy reform and over the welfare losses turns
out to be welfare gains. The key issue is that the fall in the experience premium changes
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the sign of the welfare e®ect of some generations. For instance, those individuals aged 25-
29 have welfare gains in the standard model economy with perfect substitution but welfare
losses in the one with imperfect substitution. To further understand the relevance of this
result consider for instance the individual with the median ability of each generation living
at the period of the policy reform. In the standard model economy the existing retirees
are indi®erent with the pension reform and consequently may well vote in favor it. This is
also the case of the younger generations aged 20-29. In total we have that 8 generations
would vote in favor of the reform and 7 generations that su®er welfare losses and would be
against it. Hence, the standard model economy would predict that the reform should be
implemented. Consider now the model economy with imperfect substitutability of workers
with di®erent experience levels. Now there is an additional generation (those individuals
aged 25-29) that, in contrast to the previous case, su®ers a welfare loss with the reform of
pensions. Consequently, there are 7 generations in favor and 8 against the reform indicating
political di±culties to adopt it.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I perform a set of experiments aimed at studying the role of alternative param-
eterizations concerning the degree of substitution between less and more experienced workers.
The results are shown in Figures 4 and 5 and Table 2. The numerical ¯ndings indicate that as
the degree of substitution between less and more experienced workers is lower, i.e ½ = 2 the
reallocation of labor from young to older ages translates into a shaper fall in the experience
premium in the initial periods of the transition and consequently the e®ects mentioned in
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the last section are reinforced. If on the contrary, we consider a much higher degree of sub-
stitution ½ = 0:5 which is closer to the case where this substitutability is perfect (½ = 0), the
macroeconomic e®ects of phasing out the pay-as-you-go pension system are quantitatively
similar in both model economies. Although, interestingly the welfare consequences for those
individuals aged 25-29 are still negative instead of positive as in the standard model economy,
indicating that the results concerning the lack of political support for the reform of pensions
still hold.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has extended the standard large overlapping generations model to allow for the
interaction between changes in the relative labor supply of workers with di®erent experience
levels and the lifecycle pro¯le of earnings. It is found that the macroeconomic and welfare
e®ects of phasing out the current pay-as-you-go pension system depends critically on the
modelling strategy concerning the complementarity between less and more experience work-
ers. In particular, the results indicate that a model that abstracts from this complementarity
underestimates both the increase in income inequality and the welfare losses of the agents
living at the time of the implentation of such policy who are those that should vote for it.
Hence the results of this paper go in the direction of explaining why the political support for
this policy change has shown to be weak in most of developed countries.
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Figure 1: Aggregate E®ects of Pension Reform, *:Imp. Subs,o: Per. Subs.
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Figure 2: Median ability individuals
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Figure 3: Distributional Statistics
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Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis: *Low Elas., o: Per. Subs.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis: *Low Elas., o: Per. Elas.
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Table 1: Welfare of Funding Pensions by cohort and type
Year of Birth Ability 3 Ability 11 Ability 18
½ = 0 ½ = 1:2 ½ = 0 ½ = 1:2 ½ = 0 ½ = 1:2
1930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1935 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1940 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1945 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1955 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1960 -10.495 -10.674 -3.493 -3.601 -3.730 -3.804
1965 -7.582 -7.986 -3.062 -3.374 -3.262 -3.606
1970 -6.952 -7.531 -2.965 -3.574 -3.185 -3.857
1975 -6.528 -7.398 -2.868 -3.939 -3.124 -4.279
1980 -6.040 -7.296 -2.616 -4.255 -2.913 -4.661
1985 -5.345 -6.530 -2.096 -3.616 -2.439 -4.039
1990 -4.318 -5.436 -1.217 -2.587 -1.613 -3.040
1995 -2.882 -3.858 0.098 -1.048 -0.363 -1.546
2000 (Reform) -1.469 -2.067 1.500 0.863 0.990 0.339
2005 0.002 -0.275 2.805 2.751 2.252 2.222
2010 1.633 1.355 4.115 4.200 3.488 3.618
2015 2.885 2.602 5.043 5.232 4.340 4.595
2020 3.886 3.557 5.696 5.946 4.918 5.253
2025 4.626 4.234 6.128 6.403 5.282 5.661
2030 5.075 4.636 6.383 6.668 5.495 5.896
2035 5.314 4.868 6.535 6.828 5.628 6.040
new S.S. 5.651 5.297 6.790 7.111 5.863 6.291
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare by cohort and type
Year of Birth Ability 3 Ability 11 Ability 18
½ = 0:5 ½ = 2 ½ = 0:5 ½ = 2 ½ = 0:5 ½ = 2
1930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1935 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1940 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1945 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1955 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1960 -10.590 -10.725 -3.546 -3.637 -3.750 -3.875
1965 -7.800 -8.095 -3.236 -3.461 -3.443 -3.736
1970 -7.269 -7.680 -3.306 -3.749 -3.547 -4.082
1975 -7.003 -7.641 -3.455 -4.262 -3.746 -4.657
1980 -6.722 -7.667 -3.505 -4.771 -3.851 -5.238
1985 -5.990 -6.877 -2.923 -4.091 -3.301 -4.560
1990 -4.930 -5.750 -1.969 -2.998 -2.389 -3.490
1995 -3.406 -4.123 -0.538 -1.372 -1.011 -1.906
2000(Reform) -1.757 -2.246 1.159 0.671 0.652 0.108
2005 -0.112 -0.359 2.804 2.708 2.277 2.148
2010 1.502 1.282 4.189 4.196 3.600 3.587
2015 2.754 2.520 5.184 5.243 4.533 4.583
2020 3.734 3.456 5.883 5.957 5.169 5.244
2025 4.440 4.112 6.338 6.409 5.568 5.651
2030 4.862 4.503 6.602 6.672 5.798 5.886
2035 5.097 4.735 6.761 6.834 5.939 6.032
new S.S. 5.488 5.189 7.033 7.124 6.184 6.286
33
